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With the increasing dependence on wireless LANs
(WLANs), businesses and educational institutions are
becoming more concerned about network security. The
latest WLAN security protocol, the IEEE 802.11i as-
sures rigid security for wireless networks with the sup-
port of IEEE 802.1X protocol for authentication, au-
thorization and key distribution. However, users will
remain skeptical unless they are confident and possess
some form of assurance that the security mechanism is
actually effective. In this view our Early Warning Sys-
tem (EWS) effectively confirms the legitimacy of the
802.11i security mechanism building confidence among
the users. In this paper we outline our proposed WiFi-
EWS for 802.11i wireless networks. Our system can
effectively be used for anomaly detection and intrusion
prevention. It has several levels of defense to protect
the wireless networks from a range of possible threats.
False alarms are raised only when all validations prove
negative thus significantly reducing the number of false
positives.
1. Introduction
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are one of the
fastest growing technologies within the network secu-
rity space. Unfortunately, many organizations find it
difficult to put these in effective use mainly because
of the complexity of deployment, lack of information
about its effective use and the amount of false positives.
Our WiFi-EWS helps network security administrators,
integrators and end-users to utilize their wireless net-
works to its limits and/or to meet the expectations of
their organisation.
Rule-based IDS solutions aiming at detecting al-
ready known attacks by analysing traffic flow and look-
ing for known signatures are very common [5, 7]. This
requires such IDS to be under constant construction
updating and modifying attack signatures and requir-
ing considerable resources.
On the other hand it is possible to use anomaly
based IDS solutions detecting not just known attacks
but also unknown attacks and informing system admin-
istrators about possible network problems and helping
them to troubleshoot [6, 1, 8].
Both these approaches have their own relative ad-
vantages and disadvantages. The rule-based approach
has a low false-alarm rate, but it requires us to know
the patterns of security attacks in advance and pre-
viously unknown attacks would go undetected. The
anomaly-based approach can detect new attacks, but
has a high false-alarm rate. However, all these meth-
ods are specific to wired networks and do not very
well blend with wireless environments. In this respect
our WiFi-EWS is developed specifically for 802.11i net-
works adopting a two-phase approach. Our WiFi-EWS
combines anomaly-based methods together with data
association techniques for preventing intrusions or to
detect them before penetration. The main features of
our approach are as follows:
• As a first level of defence our method looks for
timing anomalies. A systematic learning mecha-
nism is used to keep track of various timings for
wireless transmissions.
• State transition analysis is used as the second level
of defence. State tables are maintained for all par-
ticipating hosts and are tracked for anomalies.
• Accumulating historical data and effectively
querying them on-the-fly forms the third level of
defence in our system. Very fast detection of
outliers in large databases enables our system to
quickly identify intruders.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
on an intrusion prevention system for IEEE 802.11i [4]
based wireless networks. Use of multiple levels of de-
fence makes our system robust and dependable. We
have adopted fast data association techniques to iden-
tify outliers in our large wireless network traces, which
makes our WiFi-EWS novel and unique with lessor
number of false positives.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we give a brief overview of related work on network
IDS. IEEE 802.11i security architecture is briefly ex-
plained in Section 3. Section 4 introduces the concept
of our WiFi-EWS, some basic observations and prop-
erties. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Related Work
Unlike rule based analysis tools that pattern match
sequences of audit records to the expected audit tri-
als of known penetrations, the state transition analysis
proposed by Ilgun et al. [5] focuses in an audit record
independent rule-base that is easier to read than cur-
rent penetration rule bases. It also provides greater
flexibility in identifying variations of known penetra-
tions. State transition analysis also provides a mod-
est, but intuitive procedure for rule generation, rather
than ad-hoc approaches that are currently in use. Vi-
gna and Kemmerer [12] extended the above work and
developed a tool for Network-based Intrusion Detec-
tion - NetSTAT aimed at real-time network intrusion
detection. It extends the state transition analysis tech-
nique to network based intrusion detection in order to
represent attack scenarios in a networked environment.
NetSTAT is oriented towards the detection of attacks
in complex networks composed of several subnets. Al-
though this system is effective in detecting attacks in
wired networks it is not suitable for wireless network
environments.
Hall et al. [3] introduce anaomaly based intrusion
detection using mobility profiles. They discuss enhans-
ing their system by supplementing existing user and
device-based profiles, with those based on mobility.
This system is more suitable for addressing the problem
of stoten cell phones, given that the mobility behaviour
of the thief and the user are likely to be different. In
the case of wireless networks the attacker needs to be
in the same domain as the user to carry out an attack.
Therefore the use of mobility profiles will not be suit-
able for wireless networks.
Paxson’s [10] stand-alone system ”Bro” observes
network traffic directly and passively, using a packet fil-
ter. The system is conceptually divided into an ”event
engine” that reduces a stream of (filtered) packets to
a stream of higher-level network events, and an inter-
preter for a specialized language is used to express a
site’s security policy. The events are compared with
the security policy for anomalies.
Similar to the above work, our WiFi-EWS also fo-
cuses on tracking events for state transition analysis.
Further, we also validate the wireless hosts for tim-
ing anomalies. However, our system does not merely
raise alarms based on these outcomes. They perform
an outlier-based data association analysis on histori-
cal data to find the support level of anaomalies before
rasing alarms.
3. The IEEE 802.11i
Let us first take a brief look at the IEEE 802.11i
standard. The standard defines two classes of security
framework for IEEE 802.11 WLANs: RSN (Robust Se-
curity Network) and pre-RSN. A station is called RSN-
capable equipment if it is capable of creating RSN asso-
ciations (RSNA). Otherwise, it is pre-RSN equipment.
The network that only allows RSNA with RSN-capable
equipments is called a RSN security framework. The
major difference between RSNA and pre-RSNA is the
4-way handshake. If the 4-way handshake is not in-
cluded in the authentication / association procedures,
stations are said to use pre-RSNA.
Fig. 1 shows an example RSNA establishment be-
tween a supplicant (STA) and the authenticator (AP)
in an Extended Service Set (ESS). It assumes no use
of pre-shared key. Flows 1-6 are the IEEE 802.11 as-
sociation and authentication process prior to attaching
to the authenticator. During this process, security in-
formation and capabilities could be negotiated using
the RSN Information Element (IE). The Authentica-
tion in Flows 3 and 4 refer to the IEEE 802.11 open
system authentication. After the IEEE 802.11 associa-
tion is completed, the IEEE 802.1X authentication in-
dicated in Flow 7 is initiated. If the supplicant and the
authentication server authenticate each other success-
fully, both of them independently generate a Pairwise
Master Key (PMK). The authentication server then
transmits the PMK to the authenticator through a se-
cure channel (for example, IPsec or TLS).
The 4-way handshake then uses the PMK to derive
and verify a Pairwise Transient Key (PTK), guaran-
teeing fresh session key between the supplicant and the
authenticator. This is indicated in Flow 8. Thereafter,
the group key handshake is initiated as indicated by
Flow 9. The group key handshake is used to generate
and refresh the group key, which is shared between a
group of stations and APs. Using this key, broadcast
and multicast messages are securely exchanged in the
1. 802.11 Probe Request
2. 802.11 Probe Response
3. Open System Authentication Request
4. Open System Authentication Response
5. 802.11 Association Request
6. 802.11 Association Response
7. 802.1X Authentication
8. 4−Way Handshake
9. Group Key Handshake
      802.1X
SUPPLICANT
          802.1X
AUTHENTICATOR
SUPPLICANT & AUTHENTICATOR
SECURED BY TRANSIENT KEY
Figure 1. RSN Association
air.
The anomaly detection modules in the WiFi-EWS
track all nine flows shown in Fig. 1 and make a decision
on anomaly. We also use the software model [11] of the
IEEE 802.11i security specification as the base model
for detecting behavioral anomalies. The next section
describes our proposed WiFi-EWS in detail.
4. The Proposed WiFi EWS
Fig. 2 illustrates the block diagram of the proposed
WiFi-EWS. It includes a packet capturing module, an
event engine, a timing anomaly detection module, a be-
havioral anomaly detection module, an intrusion pre-
vention module and the data mining engine. The data
mining engine is the main component in our system
with the ability of processing data association requests
efficiently, preventing intrusions in real time. As men-
tioned earlier our WiFi-EWS has several levels of de-
fence, offering improved reliability for anomaly detec-
tion.
The first level of defense is the discovery of timing
anomalies followed by the discovery of behavioral
anomalies. If an event is discovered with either one
or both anomalies a third level of defense is set off to
validate the anomaly based on historical data. Since
the WiFi-EWS needs to search enormous amounts of
historical data in real time we use parallel processing
techniques to search our data base. In the following
sections we take a close look at the various modules of
WiFi-EWS.
The packet capture module captures wireless data
in promiscuous mode and delivers the captured man-
agement frames to the event engine. The event engine
performs several reliability checks to assure that the
management frames are regular. If the check fails the
WiFi-EWS generates a log indicating the problem and
discards the packet. On the other hand the event en-
gine looks up the connection state associated with the
management frame and generates the corresponding
event and adds it to the master table for scrutiny by
the subsequent modules. The following lines provide a
sample list of the management frames captured from
our experimental IEEE 802.11i wireless network.
1 0.00000000: STA1 - AP1 IEEE802.11 Authentication
2 0.00082400: AP1 - STA1 IEEE 802.11 Authentication
3 0.00253200: STA1 - AP1 IEEE 802.11 Association Request
4 0.00346300: AP1 - STA1 IEEE 802.11 Association Response
5 0.00527400: AP1 - STA1 EAP Request, Identity
6 0.20591200: STA1 - AP1 IEEE 802.11 Null function (No data)
7 0.22428900: STA1 - AP1 EAPOL Start
8 0.22706000: AP1 - STA1 EAP Request, Identity
9 0.33116600: STA1 - AP1 EAP Response, Identity
10 0.33717100: AP1 - STA1 EAP Request, EAP-TLS
11 0.41122400: STA1 - AP1 EAP Response, Identity
12 0.61183300: STA1 - AP1 TLS Client Hello
15 0.69990100: AP1 - STA1 EAP Request, EAP-TLS
16 0.70474100: STA1 - AP1 EAP Response, EAP-TLS
17 0.71026000: AP1 - STA1 TLS Server Hello, Certificate,
Certificate Request, Server Hello Done
18 0.73782500: STA1 - AP1 TLS Certificate,
Client Key Exchange, Certificate Verify, Change Cipher Spec,
Encrypted Handshake Message
19 0.81907500: AP1 - STA1 TLS Change Cipher Spec,
Encrypted Handshake Message
20 0.82157300: STA1 - AP1 EAP Response, EAP-TLS
21 0.83268000: AP1 - STA1 EAP Success
22 0.83557000: AP1 - STA1 EAPOL Key
23 0.86113200: STA1 - AP1 EAPOL Key
24 0.86614000: AP1 - STA1 EAPOL Key
25 0.87305300: STA1 - AP1 EAPOL Key
26 0.87734400: AP1 - STA1 IEEE 802.11 Data
27 0.87836000: STA1 - AP1 IEEE 802.11 Data
.
In the above traces STA1 represent the MAC ad-
dress 0c:f1:3b:db:23 of a station and AP1 represent
the MAC address 00:11:95:eb:60:51 of an access point.
These traces could be appropriately related to the mes-
sage flows shown in Fig. 1. The event engine deduces
these traces, match them with the different events and
forwards them to the anomaly detection modules for
further processing. Table 1 shows the various events
used in our system such as 11Auth, 11Assn, 1xStart
etc. The 11Assn event is deduced from the Association-
Request and Association-Response messages associ-
ated with a station. Similarly the 1xStart event cor-
responds to the EAP-Start message and the EAP-
Request-Identity message.
As described in section 3, once PTK and GTK are
installed on both the STA and AP they become as-
sociated, meaning they are synchronized. This post-
association state is where the actual data transfer takes































































































Figure 2. WiFi EWS Block Diagram
Message Flow Event
Authentication Request STA− > AP 11Auth
Authentication Response AP− > STA
Association Request STA− > AP 11Assn
Association Response AP− > STA
EAP Start STA− > AP 1xStart
EAP Request Identity AP− > STA
TLS Client Hello STA− > AP Challenge
TLS Server Hello AP− > STA
TLS Cerrtificate STA− > AP 1xComplete
EAP success AP− > STA
EAPOL Key AP− > STA ptkDerive
EAPOL Key STA− > AP
EAPOL Key AP− > STA ptkInstall
EAPOL Key STA− > AP
Table 1. Events Mapping
during this period. Therefore message flows 26 and af-
ter in the above list does not fall within our analysis.
However, all management frames transmitted during
the post-association period needs to be tracked to es-
tablish systematic state transition. The WiFi-EWS is
primarily concerned about the pre-association states
between the STA and AP and traces every manage-
ment frame transferred during this period. The post-
association management frames of the roaming hosts
are analysed to establish the transition from Associ-
ated state to Authenticating state.
The event engine also keeps track of missing and/or
dubious message flows. Each event shown in Table 1 is
associated with minimum of two message flows. How-
ever, due to intended or unintended reasons there can
be situations where round trip messages may not reach
the hosts. This type of situations could be the begin-
ning of an intended attack on the wireless network and
has to be tracked effectively. The event engine tracks
such dubious message flows for analysis by the Intru-
sion Prevention module.
The first line of defense in WiFi-EWS is the exami-
nation of timing anomalies. The WiFi-EWS maintains
Avg Max Min
Station Access Event (ms) (ms) (ms)
STA1 AP1 11Auth 0.72 2.32 0.12
STA1 AP1 11Assn 0.91 3.20 0.25
STA1 AP1 1xStart 4.35 8.41 2.88
STA1 AP1 Challenge 91.22 101.24 62.35
STA1 AP1 1xComplete 95.52 123.11 70.27
STA1 AP1 PtkDerive 25.84 42.72 13.79
STA1 AP1 PtkInstall 12.70 33.62 6.64
STA1 AP2 11Auth 0.61 1.70 0.31
STA1 AP2 11Assn 1.21 5.20 0.32
STA1 AP2 1xStart 5.60 7.83 21.54
STA1 AP2 Challenge 83.34 129.5 60.45
STA1 AP2 1xComplete 91.84 110.68 87.81
STA1 AP2 PtkDerive 22.76 32.1 18.56
STA1 AP2 PtkInstall 17.54 21.98 11.32
Table 2. Timing Profile
a timing profile for every participating host in the wire-
less environment as shown in Table 2. Maximum, Min-
imum and Average timings are stored for identifying
timing anomalies during message transfers. A timing
anomaly is raised when a host exhibits an abnormal
timing value during a round trip message transfer, i.e.
the time taken to send a message and to receive the as-
sociated response. In Table 2 we have shown a sample
timing profile for the stations participating in our ex-
perimental network. This table is dynamically updated
with new values of Average, Maximum and Minimum
times depending on the current operational nature of
the wireless environment.
The second level of defense in WiFi-EWS is the
state transition analysis. In order to ascertain the state
space of the participating hosts we used the RSN pro-
jection model developed in [11]. The first stage in state
transition analysis is to compare events with that of
the normal behavior of the hosts. A normally behav-
ing host traverses all the legitimate states in the RSN
projection model. If anomalies occur there can be sit-
uations where hosts fall into illegitimate states and do
Station State Access State
STA1 Connecting AP1 Connecting
STA1 Authenticating AP1 Authenticating
STA1 Authenticated AP1 Authenticated
STA1 Keying AP1 Keying
STA1 Associated AP1 Associated
STA2 Authenticating AP1 Authenticating
STA2 Authenticated AP1 Authenticated
STA2 Keying AP1 Keying
STA2 Disconnected AP1 Keying
STA3 Roaming AP2 Roaming
STA3 Authenticating AP2 Authenticating
STA3 Keying AP2 Keying
STA3 Associated AP2 Associated
STA4 Authenticating AP2 Authenticating
Table 3. Behavioral Anomalies
not match our projection model. For example station
STA1 in Table 3 behaves normal where it traverses all
valid states and finally reaches the associated state.
However, station STA2 does not exhibit normal behav-
ior because from our projection model a station could
not transit to disconnected state from the keying state.
Nevertheless, this may have happened due to reasons
beyond the control of the users. Therefore, WiFi-EWS
does not instantly consider such anomalies as illegiti-
mate, but they track such association and forward it to
the Intrusion prevention module for further processing.
The third level of defense is the most important in
WiFi-EWS and the module that executes this defense
is called the intrusion prevention module. This module
formulates critical decisions to verify the significance
of the anomalies discovered in the previous modules.
Hence this module plays an important role in main-
taining our system reliable and efficient. In order to
achieve our main goal of real time intrusion preven-
tion, we have adopted an efficient querying technique
proposed by Dehne et. al [2] to search our database
for data associations. Details of how we maintain our
databases and process it are reported elseware.
The intrusion prevention module executes a number
of data association analyses to decide whether anoma-
lies detected by the anomaly modules are significant
or not. Firstly, the intrusion prevention module ex-
plores the connection states associated between both
access point and station as shown in Table 4. Here, all
states associated with stations and access points are in-
vestigated. The numerical values in each row indicate
the remoteness [9] of the association. For example, if a
station is found to exhibit both timing and behavioural
irregularity we search the database for state space asso-
ciations relating to the connection state of the station
and the corresponding access point. Thus, if we find
an association with significant outlying threshold we
consider this an anomaly and issue a warning. On the
other hand if an anomaly does not meet the required
threshold we ignore it and update the database to add
{AP1, Authenticating, STA1, Disconnected, 98.4}
{AP1, Associated, STA3, Disconnected, 45.1}
{AP1, Authenticated, STA5, Connecting, 67.7}
{AP1, Disconnected, STA8, Authenticating, 45.6}
{AP1, Authenticated, STA12, Connecting, 67.7}
{AP1, Authenticating, STA17, Disconnected, 65.7}
{AP1, Associated, STA23, Disconnected, 67.2}
{AP1, Authenticated, STA25, Connecting, 75.5}
{AP1, Disconnected, STA36, Authenticating, 78.7}
{AP1, Authenticated, STA53, Connecting, 74.0}
{AP2, Disconnected, STA5, Authenticating, 79.7}
{AP2, Connecting, STA11, Disconnected, 92.4}
{AP2, Connecting, STA15, Authenticated, 94.0}
{AP2, Authenticated, STA17, Associated, 4.3}
{AP2, Associated, STA34, Connecting, 78.3}
{AP2, Connecting, STA45, Authenticated, 78.6}
{AP2, Authenticated, STA57, Associated, 7.8}
{AP2, Associated, STA64, Connecting, 68.8}
Table 4. Behavioral Associations
{1, AP2, STA5, STA6, STA12, STA15, STA17, STA19,
..STA25, STA34, STA35, 97.8}
{2, AP2, STA5, STA6, STA11, STA12, STA15, STA17,
..STA19, STA25, STA34, STA35, 98.2}
{3, AP2, STA4, STA5, STA6, STA11, STA12, STA15,
..STA17, STA19, STA25, STA34, 96.8}
{4, AP2, STA4, STA6, STA11, STA12, STA15, STA17,
..STA19, STA25, STA34, 97.2}
{1, AP2, STA1, STA6, STA11, STA12, STA15, STA17,
..STA19, STA25, STA34, 1.1}
{1, AP3, STA2, STA7, STA10, STA17, STA25, STA35,
..97.5}
{2, AP3, STA2, STA5, STA7, STA10, STA17, STA23,
..STA25, STA35, 98.2}
{3, AP3, STA2, STA7, STA10, STA17, STA23, STA25,
..STA35, 96.7}
{4, AP3, STA2, STA7, STA10, STA17, STA23, STA25,
..STA35, 96.4}
Table 5. Access Associations
such states incrementing the overall count. However,
if a situation arises where the database does not con-
tain any state corresponding to that was searched we
leave it for the discretion of the network administrator
to add such states for future analysis.
Another form of data associations considered by our
EWS is between access points and stations as shown
in Table 5. This exploration gives us an indication
of which stations are mostly associated with an ac-
cess point. A station exhibiting behavioral anomaly is
most likely to roam between several access points and
hence associations between stations and access points
are used to track stations which roam abnormally. This
data association is also used to verify the anomalies and
update the profiles appropriately.
The success of our WiFi-EWS will very much de-
pend on the capabilities of the data mining engine. Al-
though anomalies will give an initial warning towards
a security breach, the legitimacy of such threats has
to be instantly verified. Most anomaly based intrusion
prevention methods produce a large number of false
positive because of the deficiency in verifying the legit-
imacy of the security threats. In this context our main
aim of introducing parallel computing techniques for
effective data mining is to guarantee the legitimacy of
every anomaly raised in real time.
In WiFi-EWS, an alarm could be raised by an
anomaly detection module due to either an abnormal
timing or an abnormal behaviour of the wireless host.
However, this abnormality could be legitimate due to
reasons beyond the control of the anomaly detection
process. Therefore, we need another level of defence
to verify the legitimacy of such abnormalities. In our
WiFi-EWS the third level of defence, the intrusion pre-
vention module does exactly this task of verifying the
legitimacy of every detectable illegitimate functions of
the wireless hosts reducing the number of false positives
considerably.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a novel intrusion
prevention mechanism for WiFi networks. The pro-
posed WiFi-EWS is based on combining anomaly
based methods with outlier based data association
techniques. The initial experimental results obtained
with the 802.11i based network are promising and
confirming the concept of the proposed WiFi-EWS.
In the future work, the 3rd level of defense the
intrusion prevention module will be fully implemented
and the performance of the whole system will be tested.
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